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The new year is still young, yet Donald Trump’s fixation on expanding his homeland signals a troubling geopolitical shift. From Venezuela to Greenland, the world is unmistakably moving away from the relative stability of the post-cold war era – not least also because of Russia’s war against Ukraine.
This erosion of long-established norms has severe implications for Europe, a continent whose core political philosophy is built on limiting (national) power. A rules-based order, international law and negotiated solutions lie at the core of Europe’s self-image. Yet in today’s world, Europe can uphold this vision only if it evolves into a more muscular geopolitical actor itself – and nowhere is this more evident than in the Arctic.
Once regarded as a zone of peace, the Arctic has moved to the centre of geopolitical competition amid an expanding US footprint, Russia’s longstanding presence and China’s emergence as a global power. For Europe, this should not come as a surprise. The region is hardly a new frontier; the EU already has a presence there through its three Nordic member states: the Kingdom of Denmark (without Greenland), Finland, and Sweden. Indeed, the European Arctic’s vast resource wealth – from hydrocarbons to critical minerals and marine proteins – already forms part of Europe’s economic backbone and could further shape the continent’s strategic autonomy in the future.
Yet despite an evolving EU Arctic policy since 2008, and similar policy efforts by the bigger EU governments, the broader circumpolar north has remained largely absent from European strategic security debates. Its very peace and stability offered few reasons for deeper European engagement.
Trump’s renewed interest in Greenland may change this picture, as illustrated by the joint statement issued on 6 January by France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, the UK and Denmark, followed by a similar declaration by Nordic foreign ministers. Unsurprisingly, however, EU leaders and institutions have largely responded with silence or restraint, with representatives either unable or unwilling to address questions on Greenland, or resorting to empty statements on social media. Tellingly, in her annual state of the union address in September last year, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, made no reference to the Arctic – or to Greenland – an omission that underscores the internal challenges the “Arctic” has long faced within the EU’s institutional framework.
At the same time, as the European Commission and the European External Action Service begin updating the EU’s Arctic policy, the moment calls for a more fundamental question: what does northern Europe actually mean for the EU? Following the termination of the Northern Dimension (a cooperation format that involved the EU, Norway, Iceland and Russia) and amid renewed transatlantic turbulence, Europe needs a new strategic vision – one that redefines its role in a wider European north. This vision should build on the 25-year legacy of the Northern Dimension and nearly two decades of EU Arctic policymaking, while responding to today’s geopolitical upheavals and clearly articulating an EU strategic counterproposal for the region.
Here, the EU’s strength lies not in domination but in convening: bringing EU and non-EU actors together on an equal footing to shape a shared regional agenda rather than ceding influence to the nearest strongmen. For decades, north Atlantic countries have relied on access to the EU’s internal market as a guarantor of rules-based trade and economic stability. With the US stepping back from free trade leadership, the EU remains the central anchor of economic order in the region.
Such a counterproposal must go beyond existing jurisdiction and assert a stronger political claim to the European north, including non-EU partners such as Norway, Iceland, Greenland, the UK and potentially Canada. As this broader region shifts from zones of peace to spaces shaped by tension, Europe must translate its normative influence into operational capacity.
And this is where Greenland comes in. As debates increasingly revolve around acquiring – or even occupying – the island, Europe’s lack of a counterproposal is striking. This should be the moment to explicitly offer EU membership to Greenland, and by extension to the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Norway – an idea recently raised in the European parliament. Greenland withdrew from the then European Communities in 1985 after gaining home rule from Denmark in 1979, but in an entirely altered world, attitudes have changed and Europe should respond accordingly. A proposal to Greenland could be pragmatic and phased: EU membership by 2026 or 2027; early agreement on key issues such as fisheries, with renegotiation after five to 10 years; a substantial investment package targeting infrastructure and sustainable extraction of critical raw materials; and a clear commitment to preserving Inuit culture, language and local decision-making.
This would constitute a concrete offer by a continent that must increasingly step beyond its comfort zone into the realm of machtpolitik (power politics). Even as the US asserts hegemonic influence, Europe’s role as convener could ensure that Greenland – and the broader Arctic – remains a space for multilateral coordination rather than unilateral domination. Trump’s politics are, in many ways, straightforward and should not come as a surprise; what has changed is Europe’s position – from ally to something closer to a strategic frenemy. It is time for European leaders to respond accordingly – and the Arctic may be the place to begin.
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Robert Habeck served as German vice-chancellor and minister for economy and climate action from 2021 to 2025, and is now working at the Danish Institute for International Studies. Andreas Raspotnik is the director of the High North Center for Business and Governance at Nord University and a senior researcher at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute in Oslo, Norway
