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In late December, Iran experienced the beginnings of an uprising driven primarily by economic pressures, initially emerging among merchant bazaaris and subsequently spreading across broader segments of society. As events unfolded rapidly, calls for regime change became the focus of international attention. Consistent with its response to previous protest movements, the Iranian government once again opted for repression rather than engagement, violently suppressing demonstrations instead of allowing popular grievances to be articulated and addressed.
As visual evidence circulated depicting the accumulation of bodies at Kahrizak, it became increasingly evident that the primary instigator of the violence leading to these fatalities was the Islamic Republic itself, which has refused to tolerate civil unrest and has consistently responded to popular mobilisation with force.
To understand the scale of repression, it is necessary to examine the ideological foundations of the regime, which are rooted in an apocalyptic worldview. The Islamic Republic cannot be understood solely as a theocratic system; rather, it functions as part of a broader network of Shia jihadist militias across the Middle East, which are mobilised in moments of crisis to carry out violence and suppress unrest.
Reports have emerged suggesting that militias from neighbouring countries – particularly Iraq – have entered Iran to assist the government in repressing protests. Additionally, the regime maintains a devoted ideological base within Iran that demands swift state action during periods of political upheaval.
Although regime change has long been a genuine demand among a majority of Iranians, its sudden prominence was significantly shaped – and, arguably, distorted – by Reza Pahlavi, the son of the former shah, and monarchist groups within the diaspora, some of whom receive support from foreign actors, including Israel. Pahlavi called on Iranians to occupy streets and public spaces without presenting a coherent strategy or ensuring organisational preparedness.
The narrative of a “final battle”, advanced by Pahlavi, alongside expectations of foreign intervention fuelled by Donald Trump promising assistance via social media, played a significant role in mobilising individuals to engage in high-risk street protests.
As a result, the protests were in many ways hijacked by the Pahlavi-centred narrative, undermining many Iranians’ legitimate democratic demands and transforming the movement into a nationalist confrontation. Earlier protest movements – such as the green movement, largely confined to Tehran, and the woman, life, freedom movement, which originated in Kurdistan and spread nationwide – were characterised by democratic aspirations. By contrast, this uprising appears to exhibit ultra-right nationalist tendencies, instrumentalising popular demands for change rather than advancing a pluralistic democratic vision.
Iran is a multinational society composed of diverse ethnic and national groups, including Kurds in western Iran, Turkic Azeris in the north-west, and other ethnic minorities including Baluch and Arabs. These non-Persian communities maintain strong political movements that explicitly reject Persian supremacy. Kurdish political organisations, in particular, voice their opposition to Pahlavi and the Persian nationalist ideology he represents.
The political and ethnic demands of these communities have been largely eclipsed in pursuit of calls for regime overthrow by any means necessary, even when such outcomes offered no guarantees of democratic governance or equitable power-sharing. Additionally, the central role historically played by women in democratic movements, as well as the contributions of gen Z, have been marginalised and swiftly overshadowed.
Pahlavi’s ineffective leadership and the consolidation of a Persian nationalist narrative – particularly after the twelve-day war – have constrained democratic political discourse. This dynamic has further marginalised diverse perspectives, contributing to the absence of a genuinely inclusive and representative political narrative. By promoting a far-right monarchist discourse grounded in notions of Persian supremacy, meaningful democratic dialogue within Iranian civil society has been severely undermined.
Moreover, the Islamic Republic’s response – marked by a level of brutality exceeding that of previous uprisings, driven by fears of foreign intervention and the perceived likelihood of regime collapse – has resulted in significant loss of life and once again silenced the Iranian people’s peaceful and democratic demands.
Ultimately, mainstream media tend to reproduce two dominant and competing narratives: one depicting the Islamic Republic as a fundamentalist regime responsible for mass atrocities, and the other promoting a nationalist alternative rooted in monarchist ideology.
Largely absent from both frameworks are the lived realities of Iranians subjected to lethal state violence, as well as the voices of civil society actors and ethnic minority movements that remain excluded from platforms through which their demands might be heard.
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Behrouz Boochani is a Kurdish writer. Mehdi Jalali Tehrani is an Iranian political commentator
